We learned yesterday that once again someone who carried out a massacre was on the FBI’s radar, and the agency failed to do anything to prevent it.
After hours of Democrat politicians and liberal pundits attempting to politicize the tragic mass shooting in Boulder, Colorado that left ten dead as yet another example of “white men gone amok,” we learned the identity of the alleged shooter as 21-year-old Ahmad Al-Issa. Images from Al-Issa’s social media reveal that he was a practicing Muslim, complained about supposed Islamophobia, argued that America should take in more refugees and immigrants, and had a disdain for Donald Trump. Naturally, the narrative immediately shifted from “white male rage” to “we need gun control” in the liberal media, and Biden has called for bringing back the assault weapons ban (among other gun control measures).
As for the FBI’s knowledge, Fox News reports that Al-Issa was “linked to another individual under investigation by the bureau,” but no further details were reported.
And he was hardly the only one to simultaneously be on the FBI’s radar while being able to act as if they were under the FBI’s radar. As compiled by Tom Elliot on Gabrien, here are seventeen other people who were on the FBI’s radar that went on to commit or attempt to commit atrocities.
The FBI spends over $3 billion every year on counterterrorism activities, more than it spends on organized crime. The FBI does often tout cases where they blew the lid off a terrorist plot – but more often than not, these plots were created by FBI informants and a “suspect” that had no means to carry out such a crime themselves went along with it.
A review of 580 terrorism prosecutions post 9/11 found that “entrapment indicators are widespread among terrorism cases, and that the most serious cases, involving specific plots to commit attacks, have significantly more indicators. Cases with several indicators account for a sizable proportion of all cases, especially among alleged cases of jihadi and left-wing terrorism. These results show that facts and allegations supporting an entrapment defense are not confined to a small number of cases, but rather are quite widespread in post-9/11 terrorism cases. ”
The study concluded that only in 9% of terrorism prosecutions was a genuine threat of terrorism thwarted.
Not focusing attention towards cases where’s evidence of a direct threat rather than a hypothetical one has clearly proved to be costly – and is cause for much needed change in the FBI’s counterterrorism strategy.